Friday, March 19, 2010

Becoming an expert


More often than not when I mention to various friends or relatives my intention to enter the field of professional investing, their reaction ranges from disbelief to outright surprise. After all how could I possibly do well in this competitive arena without having learnt the trade at someone else’s expense before? In other words, the professionals will likely “eat me alive” and it’ll surely end badly, professionally and more importantly, financially.

These concerns are well intentioned and legitimate. They are based on the logical premise that one must prepare well before taking on any type of endeavour. After all, some of these confidants of mine may well have read Malcolm Gladwell’s book “Outliers” and its convincing arguments about the benefit deliberate practice and the 10,000 hours of practice that stands as a threshold to true mastery.

As a rather risk-averse individual (after learning the hard way) I am not inclined to easily and haphazardly join the ranks of “me-too” money managers. Yet I feel I must disclose my own statistics in the spirit of Mr Gladwell’s book. My own numbers fall far short of the 10,000 hours of dues deemed necessary to reach “proficiency”: After adding up all the reading, actual investing, security analysis, various blogging activities and verbal discussions on the subject it comes to about 1,000 hours. Put another way, I am some 10% of the way to becoming an investing expert.

The question for me however, is not how long it takes to become good at something? But rather, what are the key areas to be worked on that deliver the most return for the effort placed?. In essence have my 1,000 hours constituted a solid enough platform from which to base my future work?

Well, given that investing is a part-time endeavour for me, as I continue to be fully dedicated to another occupation for most of my waking hours (bills need to be paid after all…), there’s little hope of turning those 1,000 hours into 10,000 anytime soon. But still I am not concerned and here’s why:

a. 10,000 hours are what’s required to reach “proficiency” and I am yet to meet an investment manager that started off in the game with this much knowledge under his or her belt on day one.

b. At the risk of sounding cocky or overconfident, it’s safe to say that the majority of the “professional” competition I’ve met have certainly not dedicated their 10,000 hours to the right tasks. Frequently industry “experts” squander their time in futile asset gathering efforts rather than in perfecting their craft via diligent investing practice.

c. Related to the earlier point, the fascinating story of Dr. Michael Burry, a one-time medical doctor turned value investor (see Michael Lewis ‘s “The Big Short” book soon to be released for more information) proves that 1,000 hours of honest to god analysis counts for far more than 10 years in the industry !

As for me, here’s where I am spending the next few hours:

1. Narrowing down the search to digestible pieces. By using common sense valuation screeners, and researching the ideas of experts as generously exposed on websites such as VIC or Gurufocus. (There’s no shame in seeing where others are treading) and besides in investing there are no prices for originality.

2. Notice that I didn’t say “piggybacking” but rather “researching” other’s ideas. The point is these narrowing down exercises are the starting and not the end point of the security selection process.

3. Running the valuations in reverse (this is something that apparently Mr Buffet is keen on). It basically means trying to estimate a valuation without a previous peek into current market price. By so doing we eliminate the bias known as “anchoring” and can claim to start with an open mind.

4. Not placing artificial constraints in the initial search process. After all, since opportunities may exist in any geographic location or industry, so why rule out a specific location or sector? Having a broader target market at the initial stage of the search process should ensure that only the very best ideas reach the end of the selection process.

5. Limit potential portfolio size to under 20 securities to reap the benefits of minimum diversification and yet allow for both deep analysis of each component piece.

For now it’s time to get started and be selective. As the saying goes, “good things come to those who wait”

Thursday, March 4, 2010

Steer clear of Wall Street


Just a few days ago I wrote in this blog about my intention to publicly “walk-the-talk” as far as my investing theories were concerned. I fully intend to honour this commitment and publicly put some of my hard-earned cash to work in the markets sooner rather than later.

However, and as they say in sporting parlance, the kick-off may be delayed somewhat. Accustomed readers will surely by now be familiar with my sceptical views on the investment industry. I have previously pointed out its perverse incentives (seeking to earn volume-based fees as opposed to net performance commissions), its use of intentionally obscure terminology and most of all, its appalling track record as a source of wealth creation for all but a few of those that choose to take part in it.

Recent reading has nonetheless only aggravated my already sceptical mind-set and highlighted for me a new set of potential “investing landmines” in what already looks like a barren patch of exposed "no-man’s land". I am referring here to the apparently blessed and increasingly popular Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), and more precisely to a dangerous off-shoot referred to as Ultra Short ETFs. “Ultra” is but a fancy euphemism for leverage and “Short” merely indicates that the performance of this investing vehicle will be inverse to that of the index or benchmark it is designed to track.

So far so good I hear you say… I, for one can see the genuine appeal of a low cost, liquid fund, that can deliver returns at a time when uncertainty rules and markets are just as likely to turn bearish as they are to rise. However, and this is a maxim one would be foolish to ignore, when Wall Street concocts a “new, exciting and sophisticated product that will enhance returns whilst lowering risk” as these ETFs are branded, you’d be wise to at least, thoroughly analyse the product, if not simply to walk away from it.

Don’t believe me?. Take some time to reflect on the outcomes from the following list of once-loved and much publicised Wall Street invetions:

  1. Junk bonds (think Michael Milken and his time in jail)
  2. Portfolio Insurance in the 1980s (major contributor to ’87 crash)
  3. Long-only high P/E tech-heavy funds in late 1990s (resulting in 70% Nasdaq drop between ‘00 and ’02)
  4. Securitization or any type of structured prodcuts in ‘00s (we all know how this ended in ’08 and beyond)

In any case, the above examples are nothing new (even if people don’t actually learn anything from their mistakes). What is new however, is the remarkable and fundamental flaws in an investment fad that is happening as we speak, and that is Levered (Ultra) Short ETFs.

These products are sold as a a form of hedge or protection against a general market loss. Their performance is “guaranteed” to be the double the inverse of that of the index it tracks. In short if you expect the S&P 500 will suffer a 5% loss in 2010, buying an Ultra Short ETF will yield a 10% positive return in the same period.

Now, this sounds great, but it is in fact simply not true. Allow me to borrow from an example cited in Jason Zweig’s excellent 2010 title: “The Little Book of Safe Assets” and show you why this is the case:

Below is the actual performance of a Ultra Short ETF over 1 trading year as its benchamrk index. (this example assumes a bumpy ride made up of positive days and negative ones over the course of a full year...)

Trading daysMonths IndexUltra Short ETFVariation
0100,00100,00
20199,6098,41-1,19%
40299,2096,85-2,35%
60398,8195,31-3,50%
80498,4193,80-4,62%
100598,0292,31-5,71%
120697,6390,84-6,79%
140797,2489,40-7,84%
160896,8587,98-8,87%
180996,4686,58-9,88%
2001096,0885,20-10,87%
2201195,6983,85-11,84%
2401295,3182,52-12,79%

After a year when the market average drops by under 5% (see table above), it is nothing short of shocking to witness the Utra Short ETF, whose sole purpose is to perform inversely, lose around 17,5% of its value thus reducing 100 $ to 82,52 $! .

It seems that the field of potential investment tools, is becoming more constrained as we speak. The UF Portoflio will hence tread carefully not just in terms of asset classes and specific securities but also vehicles of choice.

As Paul Volcker , former Fed Chairman in ‘80s rightly stated on December 8th , 2009:

“ The biggest innovation in the financial services industry of the past 20 years has been the cash machine (ATM)”…”